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Tracy Mitchell Griggs's avatar

The stablecoin debate is worth watching — but we should distinguish the policy question from the economic predictions being used to support it.

Former Maryland Delegate Talmadge Branch recently raised concerns about the federal GENIUS Act and its treatment of stablecoin rewards. His central point deserves attention: while the law restricts stablecoin issuers from paying interest or yield simply for holding a stablecoin, questions remain about rewards offered through platforms and other intermediaries.

That creates a legitimate policy debate about competition with traditional bank deposits and the potential consequences for community-bank funding.

But one number in the argument caught my attention:

An estimated $1.7 billion to $2.4 billion could flow out of Maryland banks.

What is the source of that estimate?

Is it based on Maryland deposit data? A national model allocated to Maryland? Assumed stablecoin adoption rates? Consumer behavior? Community-bank exposure? And what portion represents actual projected deposit displacement rather than movement among different financial products?

Those questions matter because several propositions are being bundled together:

Stablecoin rewards may compete with bank deposits.

Community banks depend on deposits to support lending.

Community banks play an important role in small-business finance.

Reduced deposits could therefore affect lending capacity.

All reasonable subjects for analysis.

But moving from that causal theory to a specific prediction of $1.7–$2.4 billion leaving Maryland banks requires evidence and assumptions that should be visible.

There is also a larger policy question here.

If consumers choose dollar-denominated digital assets because they offer better returns than traditional deposit products, should public policy restrict those returns to protect the deposit base of regulated banks? Or should policymakers address differences in regulation, consumer protection and financial risk without limiting competition for consumers’ money?

Community-bank stability matters.

Small-business access to capital matters.

Consumer protection matters.

Innovation and competition matter too.

Those interests can be weighed intelligently — but first we need to separate what the statute actually says, what economic evidence demonstrates, and what interested parties predict may happen.

Before accepting either the “stablecoins will drain community banks” argument or the “banks are simply protecting their business model” response, I want to see the receipts.

Especially for that $1.7–$2.4 billion Maryland estimate.

Source? Methodology? Assumptions?

Those seem like very good questions to ask.

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